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DIRTY T-SHIRT TRENDS, PURE SPEECH
AND THE LAW
VALERIE SCHMIDT*
INTRODUCTION
"Single and ready to mingle;" "Yes, but not with you;" "Your
boyfriend is a good kisser;" "fcuk" (the popular French Connec-
tion logo): these phrases are emblazoned on t-shirts popular
among teenagers today.1 Should the right to wear these t-shirts
generally, as guaranteed by the First Amendment right to free
speech, be extended to allow students to wear them in school as
well? This type of speech has been called "pure" speech-defined
as that which just "happens" to take place in the school and is
void of any association with the school or its activities. 2 Because
B.S., Binghamton University, 2005; J.D., St. John's University School of Law, 2008.
I See Ian Shapira, Teens' T-shirts Make Educators Squirm, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2006,
at Al ("Such T-shirts also are emblematic of the kind of sleazy-chic culture some teenag-
ers now inhabit, in which status can be defined by images of sexual promiscuity that pre-
vious generations might have considered unhip."); French Connection,
http://www.fcusbuymail.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2008) (advertising logo "tees" such as
"fcuk it," "cool as fcuk," "too busy to fcuk," and "lucky fcuk"). See also Bettie Pudge, Let's
Stuff Some Stockings, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, available at
http://www.reviewjournal.com/personals/bettiepudge/columns/12-02-04.html (last visited
February 29, 2008) ("The easiest way to make a statement about yourself is to wear it on
a T-shirt. These tees do your advertising for you without saying a word. Not only are they
humorous, they're washable too! Be sure to check out these other fun shirts: Single and
ready to mingle; Ladies Wanted: Inquire Within; Fantasy Island: Tours For Singles; I
Think Therefore I'm Single.").
2 See Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 2004)
("Pure student expression is student expression that merely happens to occur on the
school premises"); see also Ann Kordas, Note, Losing My Religion: Controlling Gang Vio-
lence Through Limitations on Freedom of Expression, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1459-1461
(2000) (defining pure speech as that which relies on the power of ideas communicated by
an underlying message and whose audience is generally listening voluntarily to speaker's
message, as opposed to the "gray area bordering on 'pure speech,'--'"speech-plus-
conduct.' 'Speech-plus-conduct' involves a speech act combined with a conduct element,
such as picketing. 'Speech-plus-conduct' receives less First Amendment protection than
ST JOHN'S JO URNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
of this disassociation with school activity, it is distinct from other
types of speech; school administrators cannot regulate it as freely
as they can speech relating to curricular activities. 3 The problem
occurs when administrators, in an attempt to balance the stu-
dent's constitutional right to free speech with the right every
student has to an education free from disruption, regulate this
pure speech. 4
Free speech has always been a contentious subject and a hot
topic for debate. It remains so today, especially when exercised
within the confines of the school.5 It is argued that students' free
speech rights should not be as heavily protected as the rights of
citizens outside the school system, because students are gener-
ally minors who should enjoy lesser rights than adults.6 It is also
argued that the school system is a heavily regulated environment
in which free speech rights should not extend outside its perime-
ters as far as they do currently. 7 The other side to this debate in-
sists that the ultimate goal of education is to prepare students for
does 'pure speech' on the theory that the conduct element somehow taints the 'pure
speech component."') (quoting C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES
50 (1984)).
3 Kordas, supra note 2, at 1464 (stating that schools must tolerate pure speech unless
they can show that "substantial disruption of or material interference with school activi-
ties" in the school arena would occur (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)).
4 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (noting that students'
free speech rights in the classroom need to be balanced against the interest of teaching
those students); see also Anthony B. Schutz, Note, Public School Restrictions on "Offen-
sive"Student Speech in Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir.
2000): Has Fraser's "Exception" Swallowed Tinker's Rule?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 443, 444 (2002)
(noting that students and teachers face "an ongoing struggle" in balancing students' free
speech rights with "effectively educating those students").
5 See Amy Gutmann, Symposium, Free Speech and Community: What is the Value of
Free Speech for Students?, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 519 (1997) (announcing free speech in schools
to be a topic that is "hotly contested and constantly in jeopardy."); see also Russell Morse,
Note & Comment, If you Fail, Try, Try Again: The Fate of New Legislation Curbing Mi.
nors'Access to Violent and Sexually Explicit Video Games, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 171,
174 (2005/2006) (noting that minors' First Amendment rights continue to be debated).
6 See Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 168 F. Supp. 2d 332, 343 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (proposing
that minors' rights are not "automatically coextensive with the rights of adults") (quoting
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682)); see also Gutmann, supra note 5, at 520 ("If I am unsympathetic
to free speech for students, I begin with a presumption of no free speech rights, since ...
students are minors.").
7 See Gutmann, supra note 5, at 520 (noting one argument for limited student free
speech rights is that schools are "controlled educational environments"); see also Fraser,
478 U.S. at 683 (stating that school officials are the proper people to determine what
manner of speech is inappropriate in classrooms or school assemblies).
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life as citizens outside of the school.8 Proponents of this view ad-
vocate that in order to ensure the achievement of this goal, free
speech is essential, and therefore even more vital in the school
context in order to promote the free-flowing exchange of ideas be-
tween peers and administrators alike.9
On the other hand, is there a detriment to lifting this shelter
and exposing students to certain viewpoints at a young age?
Should it matter what the message is before decisions about cen-
sorship are rendered? Some courts and scholars alike have
drawn the distinction between the free speech rights of students
in elementary and even middle school, and those of high school
students, while other courts have decided cases without regard
for the age of the student speaker. 10
Should it matter that these new t-shirts are not geared to-
wards a coveted political message, but one somewhat sexual in
nature? Courts have often drawn a line between messages that
are sexually explicit and those that are not." Should the type of
speech matter? Courts have allowed schools to regulate the man-
8 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 ("'Public education must prepare pupils for citizenship in
the Republic. ... It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in them-
selves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in
the community and nation."') (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 228 (1968)); see also Gutmann, supra note 5, at 520 (finding public schools
to bear the duty of preparing students for democratic citizenship).
9 See Heather K. Lloyd, Note & Comment, Injustice in our Schools: Students' Free
Speech Rights are not Being Vigilantly Protected, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 265, 265 (2001)
('The United States Supreme Court made this pronouncement forty years ago, explaining
that students' constitutional rights, especially the right of free speech, should be vigi-
lantly protected in school."); see also Justice Mary Muehlen Maring, "Children Should Be
Seen and Not Heard" Do Children Shed Their Right to Free Speech at the Schoolhouse
Gate?, 74 N. DAK. L. REV. 679, 680 (1998) (discussing the Court's recognition, of its hold-
ing from "nearly sixty years ago"-"that students in public schools have First Amendment
rights.").
10 See Walker-Serrano, 168 F. Supp.2d at 345 (arguing that public elementary school
students' free speech rights are not always the same as those of high school students). But
see Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 344-45 (2d Cir. 2006) (evaluating the appropriate-
ness of anti-Bush t-shirt without mentioning that students were in middle school), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 3054 (U.S. 2007).
11 See Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm. 861 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Mass. 1994). The Court
has prohibited some t-shirts and allowed others based on each shirt's level of vulgarity.
See S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three R's-Repression, Rights, and Respect:
A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 139-150 (1995). "'Courts have a
First Amendment responsibility to insure that robust rhetoric . . . is not suppressed by
prudish failures to distinguish the vigorous from the vulgar."' (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at
690 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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ner of speech more readily than they have the actual content of
the speech. 12
This note seeks to distinguish between speech that is sexually
explicit and speech that has a potential double meaning or a
harmless flirtatious message. This note also seeks to distinguish
the speech of elementary and middle school students from that of
high-school students,, and emphasizes the need to give greater
freedom of speech rights to high school students. Furthermore,
pure speech rights of high-school students should be differenti-
ated from speech that is tied into the curriculum or associated
with the school's name. In order to accomplish the entire educa-
tional system's goal of preparing students for life in the real
world, educators should not stifle the free speech rights of stu-
dents, absent a substantial interference with the school's ability
to educate. This is particularly true when such speech is pure
speech.
Part I discusses relevant case law and issues that illustrate an
unpredictability in the outcome of cases involving the free speech
rights of students in the context of these popular t-shirt trends.
It will further discuss the problems associated with this area of
law as it pertains to the type and manner of speech. Part II pro-
vides a solution to these problematic legal areas, while Part III
argues in favor of giving free speech protection to these popular t-
shirts. Part IV provides a way of reconciling these cases by ad-
hering to the standard set forth in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District, and reading the holding in
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser more narrowly. Lastly,
Part V will discuss changes to the composition of the Supreme
Court and how those changes might affect the holding of a stu-
dent free speech case.
12 See Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (E.D. Va. 1992)
("School administrators sought to suppress the manner in which the message was con-
veyed, not the message itself. Thus, the case concern[ed] only the authority of school offi-
cials to regulate language displayed on clothing that they reasonably regard as inappro-
priate and offensive. Reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations on time, place, and
manner are permissible restrictions upon expression."); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683
(positing that school officials can determine what manner of speech is appropriate in
classrooms).
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I. PROBLEM AREAS IN THE ARENA OF STUDENT FREE SPEECH
The three most important Supreme Court cases interpreting
free speech in schools are Tinker,13 Fraser,14 and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,15 because they set up the three dif-
ferent standards used in student free speech cases. 16 Tinker set
forth the general rule regarding pure speech rights, with Fraser
and Hazelwood carving out limited exceptions. 17 These cases
point out several applicable variables that assist in determining
whether or not the speech is protected and whether the admini-
stration can regulate it. These factors include the type of
speech,18 whether it is the manner or content of the speech the
administrators seek to regulate, and whether the speech is tied
into a curricular activity. 19 Age is also an important aspect in
discussing free speech, as many factually similar cases have used
age to justify a different outcome. 20
13 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
14 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
15 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
16 See Guiles, 461 F.3d at 32 (describing Tinker, Fraser and Hazelwood as "a trilogy of
cases in which the Supreme Court enunciated standards for assessing whether a school's
censorship of student speech is constitutionally permissible."); see also Boroff, 220 F.3d at
468 (finding the court to have "appl[ied] the Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier trilogy").
17 See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (positing that
speech that does not fall within the realm of Fraser and Hazelwood is "subject to Tinker's
general rule: it may be regulated only if it would substantially disrupt school operations
or interfere with the right of others.") (citing Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d
524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992), Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 166); Id. at 212 ("Since Tinker, the Supreme
Court has carved out a number of narrow categories of speech that a school may restrict
even without the threat of substantial disruption."); Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529 (stating
that "all other speech" not governed by Fraser and Hazelwood is governed by Tinker).
"I See Bannon, 387 F.3d at 1213 (listing four types of student speech: "vulgar expres-
sion, pure student expression, government expression, and school-sponsored expression.");
see also id. at 1213-14 (describing the different standards applied with each type of speech
as follows: (1) vulgar expression is 'lewd, offensive, or indecent," (2) pure student expres-
sion is "expression that merely happens to occur on the school premises," (3) government
expression is "delivered directly through the government or indirectly through private
intermediaries," (4) school-sponsored expression occurs "when 'students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive [students' expressive activities] to bear
the imprimatur of the school"').
19 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 265 (discussing student speech regulation associated with
"school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities").
See generally Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (outlining student speech regulation associated with a
school assembly).
20 See Heinkel v. Sch. Bd. of Lee County., Fla., 2006 WL 2417296, at *4 (11th Cir. 2006)
(noting the district court was persuaded to hold in the school's favor by the fact plaintiff
wanted to distribute abortion materials to middle-school students ages 11-14); see also
2008]
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Although a plethora of t-shirt cases have come before the
courts in the last forty years, these new t-shirts add a twist on
the familiar, because they generally do not contain the expletives
of past-banned t-shirts, nor are they visually racy.21 This makes
it harder to determine whether the court should apply Tinker's
general rule or Fraser's exception.
As Tinker is the seminal case in the area of student free speech
rights, it is important to determine its exact holding. 22 Tinker
was decided in the midst of the Vietnam War, where students
wore black armbands to school in order to voice opposition to the
war.23 When administrators sought to prohibit students from
wearing the armbands, the case made it all the way to the Su-
preme Court.24 Judge Fortas, writing for the majority, penned
the oft-cited words; students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate."25 The Court went on to articulate the main standard still
used in free speech cases today; that unless the speech or conduct
would 'materially and substantially interfere with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' a
school's prohibition of that speech cannot be sustained."26 Al-
though the Court did not categorically define what constitutes
material and substantial interference, it made clear a high show-
ing would be necessary by saying, "undifferentiated fear or ap-
prehension of disturbance" is not enough, because the potential
Walker-Serrano, 325 F.3d at 416 (stating that schools need take account of age and ma-
turity when analyzing student free speech rights).
21 See Cindy Lavorato & John Saunders, Public High School Students, T-shirts and
Free Speech: Untangling the Knots, 209 WEST'S ED. LAW REP. 1, 1 (2006) (commenting on
past student expression cases involving armbands, newspapers, and speech at school as-
semblies as well as recent student expression cases involving t-shirts); see also Shapira,
supra note 1, at Ai (describing student t-shirts as "a chance to show some skin, without
showing skin.").
22 See Dan L. Johnston, What the Pigeons Have Done to My Statue, 48 DRAKE L. REV.
519, 520 (2000) (describing Tinker as having a significant impact on student's free speech
rights); see also Lloyd, supra note 9, at 269-70 (stating that many courts used Tinker's
standard to uphold student free speech rights); Andrew H. Montroll, Students' Free
Speech Rights in Public Schools: Content-Based Versus Public Forum Restrictions, 13 VT.
L. REV. 493, 493-94 (1989) (discussing three major student speech cases decided by The
Supreme Court, one of which is Tinker).
23 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (describing the situation at the Des Moines schools in regards
to the armbands).
24 Id. (recounting the actions of the administrators).
25 Id. at 506.
26 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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for conflict will always exist where differing viewpoints are ex-
pressed.27 Instead, the Court found that there needed to be some-
thing more than a potential for conflict or the school's discomfort
with the ideas expressed. 28 The Court further clarified that the
hostile remarks made to the students wearing the armbands
were not enough to suppress the students' right to wear them. 29
Almost twenty years after the Supreme Court decided Tinker it
again wrestled with student speech rights in Fraser. In doing so,
the Court carved out a narrow exception to Tinker's substantial
disruption standard. 30 In Fraser, the Court struck down the free
speech rights of a student who gave an election speech at a school
assembly that contained sexual innuendos regarding a fellow
classmate. 31 The Court stated that, "vulgar speech and lewd con-
duct is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of pub-
lic school education."32 Although the Court noted that some stu-
dents were "bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mimicry
it provoked," the court did not base its holding on the substantial
27 Id. at 508 (extrapolating that this potential for conflict was a risk schools had to take
in order to protect the valued right to free expression).
28 Id. at 509 (stating that school authorities needed a reason to believe that the prohib-
ited speech would substantially interfere with school operations, or would intrude on the
rights of other students).
29 Id. (clarifying that hostile remarks are not enough to justify suppressing speech).
30 See, e.g., Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002)
(outlining developmental history of students' free speech rights by explaining previous
Supreme Court cases); see also Jerry C. Chiang, Note & Comment, Plainly Offensive Ba-
bel: An Analytical Framework for Regulating Plainly Offensive Speech in Public Schools,
82 WASH. L. REV. 403, 415 (2007) ("[W]hile the court has not explicitly termed Fraser as
an 'exception' to Tinker, the differences in the legal analysis and threshold for disruption
are sufficient to constitute a departure from Tinker.").
31 The student in Fraser gave the following speech:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character
is firm-but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an is-
sue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, push-
ing and pushing until finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very
end-even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-
president-he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be.
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Leora Harpaz, Featured from
the Franklin Pierce Law Center: Sixth Annual Education Law Institute Seminar, 1999
Internet Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 2000 B.Y.U.
EDUC. & L.J. 123, 129 (2000) (explaining that speech given by high school student Michael
Fraser at a school sponsored event included intentional sexual innuendo).
32 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
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disruption factor, but rather the vulgar, lewd and obscene nature
of the conduct.33
These cases have left many questions unanswered, which has
caused difficulty in determining just how a case regarding this
new phase of t-shirts would turn out. It could be argued that
Tinker's holding, and therefore its material interference stan-
dard, is irrelevant to this context because that speech took place
during the Vietnam War, and therefore warranted more protec-
tion due to its political nature.34 Although the speech that stu-
dents sought to exercise in Tinker was political, did the Court
mean to rule exclusively on political speech, or all student speech
in general?
Further complicating matters is the fact that Fraser's holding
carved out an exception to Tinker's general rule for speech that is
sexually explicit. The standard set forth in Fraser is that of non-
tolerance for speech that is "vulgar, lewd, obscene and offensive."
But what exactly does this mean?35 Does the standard pertain to
all offensive speech generally, or does the term "offensive" take
on the sexual connotation embodied by the latter three words in
the standard? Should Fraser's standard be reserved for that
speech which is blatantly sexual and explicit, or pertain to all
speech with even a hint of sexual overtone? Should this type of t-
shirt, whose message often involves innocent, flirtatious phrases
or sexual innuendos, be categorized as vulgar, lewd and obscene
and therefore fall prey to regulation by school administrators?
There is also an argument that Fraser's standard should not be
applicable to the t-shirt context at all despite its arguably sexual
nature because of the varying context in which it occurred. The
33 Id. at 684; see also Sara Slaff, Note, Silencing Student Speech: Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 203, 222 (1987) (stating that Court in Fraser does not
apply the Tinker standard of material disruption in reaching its holding).
34 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (discussing students' desire to express their contempt for
the Vietnam War); see also Guiles, 461 F.3d at 326 (stating that there is uncertainty as to
whether Tinker was meant for political speech exclusively, or for all speech not regulated
by Fraser and Tinker).
35 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685; see James M. Dedman IV, Note, At Daggers Drawn: The Con-
federate Flag and the School Classroom-A Case Study of a Broken First Amendment
Formula, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 877, 921 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court has yet to
define lewd or indecent speech, leaving discretion in evaluating such speech to school ad-
ministrators); see also Daniel Wise, "Offensive" Speech Gets Narrow Reading at 2nd Cir-
cuit, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 6, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id
=1157462045256 (illustrating that courts have interpreted the "offensive" element of Fra-
ser's standard in different ways).
[Vol. 23:1
DIRTY T-SHIRT TRENDS AND THE LAW
speech in Fraser did not involve pure speech rights because it oc-
curred at an official school assembly, whereas these t-shirts ex-
emplify pure speech.3 6 Should Fraser's holding be limited to
analogous situations where a student's speech has been spon-
sored by his or her school? Furthermore, should it matter
whether those hearing or viewing the speech are part of a captive
audience as were the students in Fraser's assembly, or whether
those students encounter a t-shirt's message purely by chance in
a hallway or classroom?
What further complicates the issues presented by these trendy
t-shirts is the fact that the ability to regulate speech is often
based on whether administrators seek to regulate the manner of
the speech or its content.37 Some courts have held that Fraser's
standard should dominate where administrators are seeking to
regulate the manner in which the message is portrayed, not the
message itself, whereas Tinker's standard regulates all other ar-
eas where the speech regulated is based on content, not the
method or format in which it comes. 38 Therefore, whether or not
the t-shirt is protected will often depend on the way the message
is portrayed, meaning the more vulgar words contained on the
shirt, the more likely it is that school administrators may pro-
hibit it. 39 This also means that it will be difficult to predict a par-
ticular outcome for these cases because the court will first have
to determine whether it is the content or manner of speech being
regulated before deciding which standard to apply.
36 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 ("[I]t is a highly appropriate function of public school edu-
cation to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse."). See gener-
ally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (1967) (discussing examples of pure speech).
37 See Lavorato & Saunders, supra note 21, at 7 (noting that Fraser was "more con-
cerned with the plainly offensive manner in which [the speech was] conveyed" than its
actual content); see also Boroff, 220 F.3d at 465, 474, 476 (stating that although they did
not believe administrators engaged in viewpoint discrimination, if they had, then it would
be correct to apply Tinker as opposed to Fraser).
38 See Nixon v. Northern Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp.2d 965, 971 (S.D.
Ohio 2005) (stating that because punishment was based on views illustrated by a t-shirt,
not its offensive manner, Tinker is the correct standard to apply); see also Broussard v.
Sch. Bd. of the City of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (E.D. Va. 1992) (applying Fraser
because school was not seeking to ban student's message, just the manner in which it was
displayed).
39 See Mercer v. Harr, 2005 WL 1828581, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (describing the situa-
tion where the court prohibited a shirt based on the word "DAM" displayed on it and its
possible double meaning); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 691 (stating that he would not sec-
ond guess an administrators' ability to prohibit use of expletives such as "damn").
2008]
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Should school administrators be allowed to regulate these t-
shirts simply because the students have chosen to wear them to
school and therefore they reflect poorly on the school's image?
Should Hazelwood's more relaxed standard govern because it was
the most recent student free speech case or is Tinker still more
applicable?
II. ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEM AREAS
Fortunately, Hazelwood can be disposed of early in the context
of these t-shirts or any t-shirt for that matter, because its stan-
dard clearly applies to those situations where the school's name
is associated with the speech in some manner. 40 These popular t-
shirts, which fall under the category of pure speech, do not bare
the imprimatur of the school and, therefore, should not be gov-
erned by Hazelwood's more relaxed standard.41
Tinker's holding and standard should be applicable to these t-
shirts and their non-political message, because it should pertain
to more than the political context in which it was decided. The
majority opinion in Tinker, rather than focusing on the political
nature of speech, instead emphasized that the speech was
"not ... aggressive, disruptive action," but "silent, passive ex-
pression of opinion."42 Other cases interpreting Tinker have noted
the political nature of the students' protest against the Vietnam
War, but most have regarded Tinker as speaking to student
speech generally and not just on political speech.
Fraser's holding, on the other hand, should be limited to the
context it which it was decided. Limiting the holding in Fraser to
its particular circumstances would make it virtually inapplicable
to any case regarding this popular trend in t-shirts, leaving such
t-shirts answerable only to Tinker's substantial interference
40 Hazelwood involved a situation where students sought to have their articles on the
topics of student pregnancy, birth control and the impact of divorce published in a school-
sponsored newspaper. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 291. The Court held for the school, which
did not allow the articles to be printed in the next edition, claiming that there was a dif-
ference between allowing student speech to occur on the premises and sponsoring it. Spe-
cifically, where the speech is premised around a curricular activity, the Court also held
that school officials may control the "contents of [the newspaper] in any reasonable man-
ner" when "their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at
261.
41 See id. (suggesting school sponsorship to be distinguishable from pure student
speech); see also supra text accompanying note 2.
42 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
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standard. More importantly, Tinker's standard should govern
over Fraser's in the context of these t-shirts, due to the fact that
Tinker presented a situation where pure speech rights were exer-
cised as opposed to those speech rights in Fraser, which were
not.4
3
The offensive language portion of Fraser's standard should be
read in light of the rest of the standard, thereby requiring a sex-
ual connotation similar to the level emphasized by the three
words it follows. 44 Although there is currently a split in courts
regarding the meaning of the offensive portion of Fraser's stan-
dard, it is the view of the Second Circuit that seems to be the
most prevalent method taken among courts, as well as the one
endorsed in this note.45 Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Educa-
tion was decided in 2001, five years prior to the very recent deci-
sion of Guiles v. Marineau, decided in the summer of 2006.46 Both
cases involved students who wore t-shirts to their respective
schools in order to voice their personal opinions. 47 In other words,
each student exercised his pure speech rights, just as the stu-
dents in Tinker did.
Boroff involved a student who wore a Marilyn Manson t-shirt
bearing a three-headed Jesus.48 On the front of the shirt were the
words "See No Truth. Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth," and on
the back of the shirt, the word "beLIEve" appeared with the let-
43 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680 (noting that Tinker involved political speech); see also
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (summarizing that
speech not within the categories of Fraser and Hazelwood is "subject to Tinker's general
rule"); see also Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that "all other speech" not governed by Fraser and Hazelwood is governed by Tinker).
44 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 516 (noting that the speech exercised was "akin to 'pure
speech"'); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689 (emphasizing that the speech occurred at a
mandated school assembly).
44 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (setting forth a standard of allowing school officials to
regulate speech that was "vulgar," "lewd," "obscene" and "offensive"); see also Chandler,
978 F.2d at 528-29 (stating that Fraser's standard only applies to such offensive speech).
45 See Lavorato & Saunders, supra note 21, at 7 (stating that the 6th Circuit's approach
in Boroff should only be binding in that circuit); see also Wise, supra note 35 (noting that
Judge Cardamone rejected Boroffs approach).
46 Guiles, 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006) was decided on August 30, 2006, while Boroff, 220
F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000) was decided on July 26, 2000.
47 See Guiles, 461 F. 3d at 321-22 (describing plaintiffs t-shirt, which depicted Presi-
dent Bush in a negative light); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06 (finding the wearing of
armbands by students to be "akin to pure speech"); Boroff, 220 F.3d at 467 (detailing
plaintiffs Marilyn Manson t-shirt).
48 Boroff, 220 F.3d at 467.
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ters "LIE" capitalized.49 The Court ultimately held that the
school district had not violated the student's constitutional right
to free speech in prohibiting him from wearing the shirt.50 To
support their decision, the Court read the offensive portion of
Fraser's standard very broadly in not requiring a sexual connota-
tion. In effect, the Court detached the offensive portion from the
rest of the more stringent part of the standard, making it a sepa-
rate consideration. 51 Despite the fact that the school district said
it was regulating the manner of the speech, in which case Fraser
would be more applicable, it seems clear from several comments
made by school officials that the school was, in fact, regulating
the content of the speech, in which case, Tinker's standard should
have been applied.5 2 Because the Court determined that Fraser
governed, it never applied Tinker's standard despite the fact the
t-shirt did not cause any substantial disruption and lacked the
explicitly sexual content of Fraser's speech. 53
On the other hand, the Second Circuit held, in a similar con-
text, that this was pure speech not governed by Fraser, because it
read the offensive portion of Fraser's standard more narrowly
than the Sixth Circuit did in Boroff.54 Guiles v. Marineau in-
volved a student's anti-Bush shirt, which depicted George Bush's
head on a chicken's body, and several pictures of alcohol and
49 Id.
50 Id. at 471 (stating that t-shirts of this type are "vulgar, offensive and contrary to the
educational mission of the school.").
51 See Guiles, 461 F. 3d at 328-29 (characterizing Boroffs ruling as too broad); see also
Lavorato & Saunders, supra note 21, at 6 (noting that Boroff "stretches Fraser to its out-
ermost limits (and perhaps, far beyond its limits).").
52 Boroff, 220 F.3d at 472 (Gilman J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion argued that
the school officials had engaged in viewpoint discrimination because of direct statements
made by them. The principle stated, "I find some of the Marilyn Manson lyrics and some
of the views associated with Marilyn Manson as reported in articles in the news and en-
tertainment press offensive to our basic educational mission at Van Wert High School....
Mocking any religious figure is contrary to our educational missions which is to be re-
spectful of others and others' beliefs." Id. at 469-72. Ironically enough, as the dissent
points out, none of the offensive lyrics the official spoke of were actually written on the t-
shirt, and therefore they must have been regulating the ideas associated Marilyn Manson
and not the manner in which it was portrayed. Id. at 473-74 (Gilman J., dissenting). He
also believes based on the principal's statement that had it been a pro-Jesus message, it
would have been sanctioned. Id. at 473 (Gilman J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 470-71. The court did not believe the school was engaging in viewpoint dis-
crimination, but noted that if it were, then Tinker would apply.
5 Guiles, 461 F.3d at 329 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating its decision not to adopt Boroffs broad
propositions regarding Fraser); see Wise, supra note 35 (noting that Guiles blatantly dis-
regarded Boroffs holding).
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drugs, hinting at the president's prior drug and alcohol use.55 The
Court determined that the words obscene, vulgar and lewd all
have a sexual connotation to them, and the latter offensive part
of the standard could not be read apart from that context. 56 The
Court went on to hold that, because of the lack of a sexual or pro-
fane message on the t-shirt, it was not obscene, lewd, vulgar and
offensive within the meaning of Fraser.57 Therefore, the school of-
ficials would be regulating the content of the t-shirt, not the
manner, and could only do so if it were the cause of substantial
and material disruption as stated in Tinker.58
Courts should follow the predominate method of analyzing
Fraser's standard and require the same degree of obscenity,
lewdness and vulgarity that those words convey in the offensive
portion of the standard. 59 Where a t-shirt message is lacking this
type of vulgarity, it should be regulated under Tinker's standard
instead of Fraser's standard, because doing otherwise would un-
necessarily allow school administrators more freedom to regulate
the content of the student speech. 60 For example, Mercer v.
Harr l1 and Pyle v. South Hadley School Committee62 both in-
volved situations where students' t-shirts either contained exple-
tives or vivid sexual overtones. 63 The Court in Mercer held in fa-
vor of the school district because Fraser allowed the school to
regulate the manner of speech, and although capable of two
55 Guiles, 461 F.3d at 322 ('The back of the T-shirt has similar pictures and language,
including the lines of cocaine and the martini glass. The representations on the back of
the shirt are surrounded by smaller print accusing the President of being a 'Crook,' 'Co-
caine Addict,' 'AWOL, Draft Dodger,' and 'Lying Drunk Driver."').
56 Id. at 327-28 (stating that vulgar, lewd and obscene all "connote sexual innuendo or
profanity" thereby implying that "offensive" was not meant to be construed as broadly as
its dictionary definition, but rather in conjunction with vulgar, lewd and obscene).
57 Id. at 327 (holding plaintiffs T-shirt not plainly offensive).
58 Id. at 331 (stating that Fraser and Hazelwood were not applicable, but that censor-
ship was justified under Tinker).
59 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78 ("Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an
elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor."); see also Brett Thompson, Comment,
Student Speech Rights in the Modern Era, 57 MERCER L. REV. 857, 862-63 (2006) (noting
the graphic and explicit nature of student's speech in Fraser).
60 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
61 2005 WL 1828581 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2005).
62 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994).
63 In Mercer, the student's t-shirt read "Somebody Went to HOOVER DAM And All I
Got Was This 'DAM' Shirt." Mercer, 2005 WL 1828581, at *1. Pyle involved a situation
where student's experimented with the boundaries of what school administrators would
and would not tolerate by wearing different t-shirts with different messages to school. See
Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 163.
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meanings, the word "Dam" in "Somebody Went to Hoover Dam
And All I Got Was This 'Dam' Shirt," was properly prohibited as
an "inappropriate expletive."64 Similarly, the Court in Pyle em-
phasized that it was prohibiting the t-shirts not for their content,
but for the vulgar manner in which the messages were dis-
played.65 For example, one shirt read, "See Dick Drink. See Dick
Drive. See Dick Die. Don't be a Dick.," 66 while another read
"Coed Naked Law Enforcement: Up Against the Wall and Spread
'Em." 67 The Court noted that when it comes to regulating the
manner of the message, school administrators, not the courts,
should make the determinations in the interest of judicial econ-
omy.68 As it pertains to the "See Dick Run" t-shirt and the "Hoo-
ver Dam" shirt, schools clearly can regulate these shirts based on
the double meaning of the potentially expletive word, rationaliz-
ing it as controlling the manner and not the content of the
speech.69 On the other hand, the Coed Naked t-shirts that were
prohibited, although lacking the expletive of the prior examples,
contained language conveying a more sexual connotation than
the flirtatious t-shirts popular today. 70 Accordingly, only the
64 Mercer, 2005 WL 1828581, at *5-7 (noting that "administrators are permitted to con-
sider more than the literal meaning of the words or images at issue.").
65 Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 168 (stating that various clever t-shirts were allowed and only
ones considered "vulgar were banned"); see James Podgers, What to Wear: Courts Agree on
Principle of School Dress Codes, Disagree on Their Reach, 81 A.B.A.J. 60, 60 (1995) (dis-
cussing that the t-shirts worn by students in Pyle were banned because their context was
obscene or vulgar).
6Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 158.
67 Id. at 170.
6 Id.
Unless federal courts are to take on the task of assessing, each morning of the
school year, the latest creations of the adolescent imagination-or rather the latest
mass-produced products of the commercial exploiters of the adolescent imagina-
tion-the limits on vulgarity in secondary schools, assuming a general standard of
reasonableness, are to be defined by school administrators, answerable to school
boards and ultimately to the voters of a community.
Id.; see Clay Weisenberger, Constitution or Conformity: When the Shirt Hits
the Fan in Public Schools, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 51, 57 (2000). The court in Pyle con-
cluded that school authorities had the power to decide what speech "constituted
vulgarity." Id.
69 See Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 168 (noting that school administrators were not trying to
suppress messages sanctioning drinking and driving, just the manner in which it was
displayed); see also Mercer, 2005 WL 1828581, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (stating that "dam,"
used in this context, "this dam shirt," is an "inappropriate expletive").
70 Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 170 (illustrating some examples of the prohibited Coed Naked
shirts such as: "Coed Naked Law Enforcement: Up Against the Wall and Spread 'Em" and
"Coed Naked Lacrosse: Ruff and Tuff and in the Buff."); see, e.g., Justin T. Peterson,
Comment, School Authority v. Students' First Amendment Rights: Is Subjectivity Stran-
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more sexually explicit Coed Naked shirts were prohibited. 71 Al-
though it appears these shirts were regulated by Fraser's stan-
dard based on their content rather than the manner of speech,
the popular t-shirts of today are distinguishable, even on a con-
tent basis, because of their less explicit sexual nature.7 2
Use of Fraser's standard should be limited to situations either
similar to its own, or to those analogous to Mercer and Pyle.
Many variables present in Fraser make it an inappropriate
precedent upon which to govern these t-shirts. The Supreme
Court placed specific weight in that case on the fact that the
speech took place at a school-authorized assembly. 73 Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion supports this notion as he stated
that the speech probably would have been protected had it not
occurred at a school assembly. 74 Hazelwood later confirmed that
the Court deemed central to its holding the fact that the school
was "entitled to 'disassociate itself from the speech."7 5 Hazelwood
is also representative of the overall presumption that speech in
any way connected with a curricular activity deserves less pro-
gling the Free Mind at its Sources, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 931, 973 (2005) (noting that the
t-shirts Pyle wore to school included phrases like "A Century of Women on Top").
71 Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 170. Some examples of Coed Naked shirts that were allowed
were, "Coed Naked Gerbils" and "Coed Naked Censorship." The court stated that various
clever t-shirts were allowed and only ones considered "vulgar were banned." Id. at 168.
See Kay P. Kindred, When Equal Opportunity Meets Freedom of Expression: Student-On-
Student Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment in School, 75 N. DAK. L. REV. 205,
238 (1999). Kindred notes that courts have allowed schools to restrict "vulgar and offen-
sive" speech "regardless of whether there [was] any risk of substantial disruption." Id.
72 See Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 170. The Court found that the school officials were not try-
ing to prohibit students from joining the Coed Naked Band, but a desire to join the band
was arguably not the message behind the t-shirts, and it seems clear that the officials
were seeking to prohibit the sexual message implied in the t-shirts. Id at 168; see Clay
Weisenberger, supra note 68, at 60. Weisenberger emphasized that the "rights of others
encompasses a general interest in being shielded from vulgar or offensive language, which
technically falls under the school's duty of protection." Id.
73 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (noting that the speech was conducted before an "official
high school assembly attended by 600 students"); see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct.
2618, 2624 (2007) (discussing the constitutionality of censoring a banner posted at a
school function that displayed illegal drug use).
74 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689 ("Respondent's speech may well have been protected had
he given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school's legitimate in-
terests in teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were less weighty.") (Brennan,
J., concurring); id. (limiting the breadth of this Court's holding to "disruptive language in
a speech given to a high school assembly"-- Fraser's assembly was part of "the educative
function of the Bethel School District" because it was school-sponsored); Robert Block,
Note, Students' Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the Public Schools: Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 739, 759 (1986).
75 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
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tection that that which is not.76 There is notable contract in the
fact that many of the modern day t-shirts are solely pure speech
as opposed to the speech in Fraser, which was spoken at a man-
datory school assembly.
The "captive" nature of the audience in Fraser added to the ar-
gument for suppression of the speech; another important distinc-
tion between those students and ones wearing modern trendy t-
shirts. 77 A further argument for limiting Fraser to its specific
context is the fact that the Supreme Court placed significant
weight on the attendance of younger students at the assembly. 78
The offensiveness of the speech increases when it is directed at a
captive audience comprised of younger students, especially when
it is a school-sanctioned event. Fraser's holding is therefore in-
applicable, as these flirtatious trendy t-shirts are not directed at
a captive audience and the school's name is not implicated.
III. WHY PROTECT STUDENT'S TRENDY T-SHIRTS AT ALL?
Although free speech rights may have been premised on giving
citizens the right to voice their political opinions and spread
ideas, the right to free speech is also important in the educa-
tional context. 79 In fact, the educational context makes it even
76 Id. at 267 (holding that a "'determination of what manner of speech in the classroom
or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board,' rather than
with the federal courts" (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683)); see Chris Sanders, Censorship
101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free Speech at Colleges and Universi-
ties, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159, 165 (2006) (emphasizing that the Hazelwood Court expanded
permissible control of student speech so long as school officials were able to "demonstrate
that their actions '[were] reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns"').
77 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684. 'These cases recognize the obvious concern on the part
of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children-especially in
a captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." Id.; see
also Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1537 (7th Cir. 1996). Students in
Fraser were "a captive audience" -therefore making protection more necessary. Fraser,
478 U.S. at 684.
18 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (stating that Fraser's speech could harm those less ma-
ture members of the audience who were only 14 years old); see also Muller, 98 F.3d at
1537 (noting age as a significant reason for Fraser's holding); Block, supra note 74, at 754
(illustrating that all students in Fraser were high-school students "and the need to protect
them against offensive speech is less compelling than is the need to protect young chil-
dren"); John C. Walden & John L. Strope, Jr., Beyond the Boundaries of Socially Appro-
priate Behavior: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 32 ED. L. REP. 1173, 1181 (1986)
(stating that Fraser noted how many of the students at the assembly were fourteen and
not ready for sexual discussions (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683)).
79 See Gutmann, supra note 5, at 520 ("Democracy itself relies on free speech to allow-
and-indeed-to encourage citizens to discuss their political differences and to convey their
[Vol. 23:1
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more vital to protect the rights of students, as it ensures the "ro-
bust exchange of ideas" vital to learning and expanding young
adults' horizons.80 As it is the primary goal of the school system
to prepare students for life outside its walls, the school should al-
low the same free flow of ideas students will encounter after
graduating.8' Some argue that high school students are not ma-
ture enough to benefit from the market place of ideas theory.8 2
However, this generalization should not outweigh the goal of
providing an opportunity for students to experience a wide vari-
ety of viewpoints through free speech rights.8 3 This would not
only help them adequately adapt to life after graduation, but also
allow them to gain the maturity critics say is lacking.8 4
Free speech is not a value confined to the United States, but is
one that maintains international recognition.8 5 Scholars contend
views-both popular and unpopular-to their representatives and to each other."); see
also Are Dress Codes a Drag? School Fines Boy for Wearing Dress to the Prom, WKLY.
READER, Sept. 30, 2005, at 3, available at 2005 WLNR 15314526 (discussing how some
cases have held for greater protection when political expression is involved).
so Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
81 See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 439 F.
Supp. 2d 1242, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2006) ("[I]t is the primary function of our schools to pre-
pare their students for citizenship.... in a country which prizes diversity and dissent.");
see also Sara-Ellen Amster, Teaching Students to be Citizens: Many Educators Don't Show
Respect for Young People's Opinions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 13, 2006, at B, avail-
able at 2006 WLNR 6345426 (showing concern about teacher's caring "more about keep-
ing students under control and quiet than teaching them the value of the First Amend-
ment" and noting that schools often fear parents' reactions and this is why they refrain
from "building inquisitive citizens"); Zinie Chen Sampson, ACLU Asks for Apology in 'La-
tinos' T-shirt Case: Woodbridge School Principal Detained Young Boys Whose Clothing
had Slogans on It, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Apr. 4, 2006, at B1, available at 2006 WLNR
5951397 (quoting an ACLU executive who said that although students are constitution-
ally permitted to exercise their free speech rights in schools so long as it does not cause
disruption, schools should embrace and support this right more).
82See Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980) ("A high
school student's lack of the intellectual skills necessary for taking full advantage of the
marketplace of ideas engenders a correspondingly greater need for direction and guidance
from those better equipped by experience and reflection to make critical educational
choices."). But see Amster, supra note 81, at B2 (stating that educators cannot help build
future "leaders and writers" if they do not teach them about life outside of school).
83 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
85 See Matthew Rojansky, Europe Doesn't Get Free Speech Double Standards, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 25, 2006, at 6 (noting the guaranteed right of freedom of expression as
set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights, which "legally binds all EU
states and supersedes domestic law"); see also Ambika Kumar, Using Courts to Enforce
the Free Speech Provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7
CHI. J. INT'L L. 351, 362 (2006) (recognizing the global importance of the right of free ex-
pression and stating that Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
ST JOHN'S JOURAL OF LEGAL COMMENARY [Vol. 23:1
that the best way to avoid repeating past racially or culturally-
motivated violence is to teach "tolerance and respect for different
cultures and beliefs, not gag those who express conflicting
ideas."8 6 Furthermore, the marketplace of ideas concept is not
limited to the First Amendment context, as diversity of view-
points is one of the main arguments in favor of allowing the use
of inherently suspect racial classifications to gain diverse high
school student populations.87
Furthermore, permitting students to wear controversial t-
shirts does not appear to cause harm to the student population,
which was one of the concerns expressed in Tinker.88 In fact, forc-
ing students to change out of "offensive t-shifts" or leave the
classroom seems to be more disruptive to the educational process
than simply leaving the student alone. Although some may ques-
tion if there is an actual message in these shirts8 9 or whether
there is value to protecting the flirtatious meaning of these t-
shirts, it is not just about the messages of each individual t-shirt,
but about allowing students to gain exposure to all ideas and
Rights reflects a conscious effort on the part of its drafters to protect both political and
non-political speech).
86 See Rojansky, supra note 85, at 1 (criticizing Europe's suppression of hate speech and
other "harmful" speech and finding that suppression is likely to cause, rather than pre-
vent, future hate-motivated crimes); see also Jonathan Milne, NUT Boss Gets Hate Mail,
TIMEs EDUC. SUPPLEMENT, May 18, 2007, at 4 (stating that the UK's Education Secretary
advocated the teaching of such British values as tolerance and free speech in schools, be-
lieving that doing so would help to "overcome the extremism behind race riots and the
London bombings.").
87 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162
(9th Cir. 2005). This is a case involving the school district of Seattle's desire to use race as
a factor in admission to high school. Id. at 1169-71. Seattle's School District struggled for
over four decades to desegregate its schools and prevent its schools from "replicat[ing] Se-
attle's segregated housing patterns." Id. at 1166. Because racial classifications are "inher-
ently suspect" as a violation of equal protection, the court applied a strict scrutiny test. Id.
at 1200 (Bea J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 223
(1995)). Despite this rigorous test, the court held the racial classification to be within con-
stitutional bounds. Id. at 1193. "Diversity is thus a valuable resource for teaching stu-
dents to become citizens in a multi-racial/multi-ethnic world." Id. at 1174.
88 See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (stating that student free speech rights should
be protected absent a showing that the speech at issue would cause a "substantial disrup-
tion"); see also Block, supra note 74, at 755 (arguing against Fraser's holding due to a lack
of evidence of harm resulting from student's speech); Shapira, supra note 1, at A2 (noting
a paradox in the lack of harm to teens from the increasing popularity of racy t-shirts
based on data showing that teens report "having less sex than their predecessors").
89 See Mercer, 2005 WL 1828581, at *6 (expressing doubt that a student who wore a t-
shirt bearing the message "Somebody Went to HOOVER DAM And All I Got Was This
'DAM' Shirt" meant to convey a "particularized message").
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values without censorship. In effect, it allows them to decide for
themselves with which viewpoints they agree or disagree.90 The
benefits of increased exposure to uncensored ideas necessitates
protection even though administrators or other students might
disagree with the messages or are disgusted with a student's
choice to personify him or herself in that manner.9 1
IV. HOW TRENDY T-SHIRTS SHOULD BE HANDLED
T-shirt messages should be met with a certain level of scrutiny,
but should be guided by the standards announced in Tinker as
opposed to those of Fraser. The nature of the speech in the con-
text of popular t-shirts is more akin to that in Tinker because it
is an example of pure speech. 92 If a student chooses to wear a
suggestive t-shirt, as long as it does not disturb the educational
environment, negative administrative viewpoints should not
trump the long valued right to free speech. Furthermore if diver-
sity of viewpoints is so valued, that it can serve as a compelling
interest justifying the use of racial classifications, then it should
not be stifled unless it has caused substantial disruption, barring
a narrow exception for regulating the manner in which such
speech is displayed. 93
The age of the student should also be a factor in determining
the suitability of a t-shirt's message. Many cases have recog-
nized the lesser free speech rights of elementary and middle
school children, particularly where such speech involves sexual
w0 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (noting that the "[n]ation's future depends" on students'
unfettered exposure to a wide variety of ideas so that they can later determine their own
viewpoint); see also Gutmann, supra note 5, at 521 ("We need to make up our own minds
about public issues in interchange with others; otherwise, we will be isolated atoms who
can much more easily misunderstand and therefore threaten other people with whom we
do not have close relationships").
9' See, e.g., Shapira, supra note 1, at A3 (quoting an employee selling these types of
shirts who said she wonders why girls buy them as she believes it shows a girl to have
"'no respect for herself"); see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (noting the importance of exposing
people to a wide variety of ideas); see also Shapira, supra note 1, at A2 (talking about one
principal who questioned his students choice to wear one of these types of t-shirts).
92 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. The student's in Tinker wore armbands, which the court
called a "silent, passive expression of opinion." Id. The student in Fraser, on the other
hand, gave a speech that was sexually aggressive and explicit to a captive audience at a
school-sponsored assembly. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
93 See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 982
(2003).
2008]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
references. 94 For example, the Court in Muller v. Jefferson Light-
house School held that elementary school was "more about learn-
ing, including learning to sit still and be polite, than about robust
debate. '95 Interestingly enough, when the Court in Broussard,
struck down a middle school student's right to wear the shirt
"Drugs Suck," the reasoning behind prohibiting the shirt was not
only that younger students do not automatically deserve rights
equal to those of high school students, but also that students of
that age tend to be more distracted by words that are sexual in
nature. 96 This reasoning follows the rationale and idea behind
the substantial disruption standard announced in Tinker (that of
tolerance of student speech so long as such does not interfere
with the ability to educate), more than it does the prohibition of
vulgar and obscene words announced in Fraser.
High school students should have the right to wear t-shirts of
this nature, regardless of peer or administrative disapproval, as
it is not as necessary to protect them as it is to protect younger
students. Though it is arguable that even high school students
are too young to act maturely enough when confronted with a
borderline explicit t-shirt, this does not justify the speech prohi-
bition. If schools "wait until students demonstrate they will use
their freedom of speech wisely, then students [may] never be
given enough freedom of speech to learn to use it responsibly,"
and then the opportunity to utilize it among peers in an educa-
tional setting will be lost.97
Regulating these t-shirts under Tinker's substantial disruption
standard serves more than just receiving the benefits of free
speech. Because Tinker's standard calls for allowing student free
speech, unless it would substantially interfere with the ability to
educate, it gives students more control over what is and what is
not permissible. It makes students self-regulators, reinforcing
94 See, e.g., Baxter v. Vigo Cty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
elementary students do not have clearly established free speech rights (citing Fraser, 478
U.S. at 682; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272)); see Ginsberg v. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629, 636-37
(1968) (recognizing lesser rights extending to minors when it barred any sale to minors of
"sexually oriented material," while allowing sale to adults); see also Broussard, 801 F.
Supp. 1526, 1534-35 (E.D. Va., 1992) (striking down a student's right to wear t-shirt with
message "drugs suck" due to possibility of students perceiving 'suck' sexually).
95 See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996).
96 See Broussard, 801 F. Supp. at 1535 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting the tendency of junior
high to high school-aged students to be distracted by words with sexual connotation).
97 Gutmann, supra note 5, at 526.
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traditional American democratic principles. 98 Although the stu-
dents wearing the popular modern t-shirts may not be exercising
the same political anti-war speech of Tinker, free speech is sup-
posed to allow for the dissemination of opinions without regard to
content. 99 Although some messages may spark a debate, the en-
couragement of opposition and exchange of ideas is part of the
nature of the right of free speech. School speech should thereby
only be prohibited if it interferes with the administration's ability
to educate. This method of dealing with student speech serves as
a check on administrative power, not student power. Accord-
ingly, students who chose to disrupt classroom activities in order
to get a shirt banned, could certainly ruin free speech rights for
other students, thus proving those theorists right who say stu-
dents lack enough maturity to handle such a privilege. If this oc-
curred, students in that school would lose the privilege to wear
such shirts because the need for disruption-free education would
outweigh free speech rights. This should be determined indi-
vidually in each school, rather than never allowing the opportu-
nity for students who are mature enough.
An analogy can also be drawn between the standard employed
in Tinker, and the standard employed in cases regarding parents
who seek to exercise their First Amendment freedom of expres-
sion, further bolstering the argument for Tinker's relevance. 10
There have been several cases regarding parents who came to a
marital agreement on which religion their children would be
raised, but whom, post-marriage, sought to break this agree-
ment.101 Courts have repeatedly struck down the agreements as
98 See Gutmann, supra note 5, at 527 (stating that students in Tinker "were taught that
a constitutional democracy respects-indeed even values-dissent and criticism of gov-
ernmental action."); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09 (noting that the constitutional
right to voice opinions that differ from the majority is "the basis of our national strength
and of the independence and vigor of Americans").
99 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (1967) (noting that students wore black arm bands to
publicize their objections to the Vietnam War); see also Huntley v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 442
P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1968) (arguing that the freedom of speech is more then just the right
to be protected from censorship of content).
100 See Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treat-
ment of Free Speech and Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 361
(2004) (noting that both freedom of speech and religion are fundamental freedoms they
have not always been treated alike by the courts).
101 See generally Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. 1997) (describing a fa-
ther's effort to expose his children to Catholicism after a divorce from their mother despite
prior agreement to raise the children in the Jewish faith); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d
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non-binding because of the high-degree of protection given to
freedom of religion and expression.10 2 What does this have to do
with free speech rights? Well, courts have applied a similar
standard to these religious selection cases as they have to stu-
dent free speech cases. A parent who seeks to prohibit the other
parent from expressing his or her religious viewpoints to their
children will have to show substantial harm from the indoctrina-
tion in order to suppress the other parent's rights.10 3 The ration-
ale behind this is that the freedom of expression rights are so
valued, even where a pre-marital agreement existed prior, that
absent a high degree of harm resulting from exposure to the re-
ligion, courts should not suppress it.104 This is similar to the
standard and rationale pronounced in Tinker, where the Court
was reluctant to suppress the pure speech rights of students
unless a substantial disruption resulted from exposure to the
message. 105 Neither of these cases was decided based on what
particular religion was at issue or what message the parent
sought to teach the child. Instead, the Court focused on broad
1130 (Pa. 1990) (discussing a factual scenario in which both husband and wife had agreed
to raise the children in the Jewish faith but post-marriage the father changed his mind).
102 See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144 (stating that such oral agreements are not legally en-
forceable because "enforcement would be contrary to a public policy embodied in the First
Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses ... that parents be free to doubt,
question, and change their beliefs, and that they be free to instruct their children in ac-
cordance with those beliefs."); see also Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ohio
1958) (holding that such contracts can not circumscribe or control the free choice of reli-
gious practices).
103 In Zummo, the court upheld the father's right to expose his children to Catholicism
and rejected the argument that exposure to varying religions is generally harmful hold-
ing, that "to justify restrictions upon parent's rights to inculcate religious beliefs in their
children, the party seeking the restriction must demonstrate ... that the belief or practice
of the party to be restricted actually presents a substantial threat of present or future
physical or emotional harm to the particular child ... and that the restriction is the least
intrusive means adequate to prevent the specified harm." 574 A.2d at 1157. In Kendall,
the court stated that "the determinative issue is whether the harm [to the children was]
so substantial so as to warrant a limitation on the defendant's religious freedom." 687
N.E.2d at 1232. The Kendall court found substantial harm because the father's religious
sect taught that all other religious believers would be damned to hell and the father him-
self had cut off his son's payes. Id. at 1233.
104 See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1146 (positing that the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses protect the right to change one's mind regarding religion); see also Bagley v.
Raymond Sch. Dept. 728 A.2d 127, 135-36 (Me. 1999) (asserting that the Establishment
Clause prohibits branches of government from supporting or advancing religion even in
subtle ways).
105 See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (noting that to justify prohibition of expression,
it must substantially interfere with appropriate school disciplinary measures (quoting
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d at 744, 749 (C.A. Miss. 1966))).
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freedom of expression rights, barring substantial harm to the
child's psychological state. 106 Likewise, where students choose to
wear modern t-shirts, the focus should be on the right of every
American to free speech, regardless of the message, unless such
would interfere with the overarching interest of turmoil-free edu-
cation.
What constitutes substantial interference warranting a prohi-
bition of a student's pure speech rights? The Court in Tinker did
not affirmatively define or state a specific level that need be at-
tained before prohibiting the speech.10 7 Instead, the Court de-
noted what would not be enough to suppress the speech by saying
that more than a fear of conflict need be had in order to suppress
student free speech rights.108 The Court held that although some
hostile remarks were made to the students wearing the arm-
bands outside the classroom, this was not enough to suppress
their free speech rights because there was no evidence of actual
school disruption. 0 9
Cases following Tinker have shed some light on what will and
will not constitute substantial and material interference, but it
remains largely an individual case determination. For example,
in Brogden v. Lafon, a student was prohibited from wearing a
Confederate Flag t-shirt because of actual altercations that oc-
curred between students as a result of the racial implications of
the confederate flag symbol." 0 Courts have generally upheld the
106 See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1134 (explaining that free exercise clause protects "'the in-
fidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism"'
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)); see also Kendall, 426 Mass. at 239
(discussing parents' religious disagreements and explaining that they would be of no sig-
nificance except for their effect on their children "caught in the crossfire").
107 See Guiles, 461 F.3d at 326 ("Nor is Tinker entirely clear as to what constitutes 'sub-
stantial disorder' or 'substantial disruption' of or 'material interference' with school activi-
ties.") (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1967))).
10 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (stating that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of dis-
turbance" is not enough, because potential for conflict will always be there where differing
viewpoints are expressed); see D. Jarrett Arp, Note, Beyond Mergens: Balancing a Stu-
dent's Free Speech Right Against the Establishment Clause in Public High School Equal
Access Cases, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 156 (1990) (noting that a teacher who seeks to
restrict a student's free speech rights must do so on more than a "hunch or fear").
109 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. The court also weighed heavily the fact that the school had
allowed other speech rights to be exercised regarding other controversial topics. Id. at
511. The court said it was inherent in the constitution that the school could not discrimi-
nate against one viewpoint while allowing others without clear evidence of a necessity due
to hindrance with schoolwork. Id.
110 D.B. v. Lafon, 2006 WL 1875585, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. 2006). There had been numerous
"racially motivated incidents, including physical altercations between Caucasian and Af-
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strict standard the Court in Tinker meant to impose, by not pro-
hibiting even controversial speech, save actual interference. For
example, in Barber v. Dearborn Public School, the Court held
that the school could not prohibit a student from wearing a shirt
with the words "International Terrorist" written on it, despite
fact that many Middle Eastern students at the school may have
been offended."1 Furthermore, the Court stated that the few hos-
tile remarks made to school officials regarding a dislike of the
shirt did not qualify as a substantial disruption or material inter-
ference. 112
These modern flirtatious t-shirts are unlikely to cause the level
of disruption or interference which warranted the suppression of
the pure speech rights in Brogdon due to the sheer fact that most
of them contain harmless flirtatious messages, not the anti-war
or racial profiling messages that are more likely to incite vio-
lence.
V. RELEVANT CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME
COURT
Although it is unclear exactly how the Supreme Court would
rule on the issue of modern suggestive t-shirts, the viewpoints of
some Justices may be discernable from past opinions. Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, who recently resigned from
rican-American students, racially motivated threats against African-American students,
and civil rights complaints, which created a racially tense and charged atmosphere." Id.
The court also noted that there need not be a "direct causal" link between the speech pro-
hibited and the facts that lead a school district to claim substantial disruption, just a like-
lihood of substantial disruption occurring. Id. at *5.
111 286 F. Supp.2d 847, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Barber wore the shirt to school in order
to express his anti-war sentiment and his view against Bush's foreign policies. Id. The
school district argued that some students had complained about the shirt and were angry
about it as a rationale for likelihood of disturbance. Id. The district further argued that
the school's student population contained the largest Arab population outside the Middle
East making it even more likely that the shirt would cause disruption. Id. The court re-
jected the school district's argument saying that the mere existence of a large number of
Middle Eastern students at the school is not sufficient to warrant suppression of students'
pure speech rights. Id. at 857.
112 See Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 856-57 (2003). The court re-
lied upon Tinker's holding that a few hostile remarks were not enough to suppress a stu-
dent's pure speech rights. Id. at 853. Indeed, the Barber court found it especially relevant
that Tinker upheld student expression designed to oppose "one of the most controversial
times in this Nations' history-the Vietnam War." Id. Thus, the Barber court viewed stu-
dent opposition to today's controversial United States foreign policy decisions to be no less
protected than it was during the controversial Vietnam War era.
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their positions on the Court, were the last of the two Justices who
joined the plurality in Fraser.113 Furthermore, Justice Stevens,
who wrote the dissenting opinion in Fraser, is the only Justice
from the case remaining on the Supreme Court.114 Justice Ste-
vens dissented because he believed that the school had not given
the student enough warning about possible disciplinary action,
and also because the speech itself was not materially disrup-
tive. 11 5 He further stated, "a strong presumption in favor of free
expression should apply whenever an issue of this kind is argu-
able."11 6 Moreover, Justice Stevens noted the difference between
connotative speech,11 7 and that speech which might contain an
expletive.118 Justice Alito, being the newest member of the Su-
preme Court, had the opportunity earlier in his career to write on
the issue of student free speech.1 19 In the context of a challenge to
an anti-harassment statute, Alito seems to take a relatively
broad view of the free speech rights of students. 20 "[T]here is no
question that the free speech clause protects a wide variety of
speech that listeners may consider deeply offensive, including
statements that impugn another's race or national origin or that
denigrate religious beliefs."' 21 He also reversed the District
Court's opinion that harassment has never been protected under
113 See Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986) (stating that Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor
joined the plurality opinion).
114 Id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 693-94. Justice Stevens argued that the student "should not be disciplined for
speaking frankly in a school assembly if he had no reason to anticipate the punitive con-
sequences." Id. at 693. Further, he stated that there was no "material interference with
the educational process that justifie[d] impinging upon" the student's right to freedom of
expression. Id. at 694.
116 Id. at 696.
117 See id. (arguing that the student's speech would have been inappropriate in certain
classroom settings, but might be regarded as "rather routine comment" in other contexts
within the school).
11s See id. at 691. "High school administrators may prohibit the use of [expletives] in
classroom discussion."
119 This suggests that Justice Alito sympathizes with students rather than schools. See
Linda Greenhouse, Court Hears Whether a Drug Statement Is Protected Free Speech for
Students, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A16. See generally Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214, where
Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion.
120 Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216-17 (describing defendant's anti-harassment statute); see
Greenhouse, supra note 118, at A16 (quoting Alito as finding the argument that a school
does not have to tolerate a message that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission
to be "very, very disturbing").
121 Saxe, 240 F.3d at 206.
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the First Amendment. 122 Furthermore when applying Fraser's
standard to the case, Alito read the standard more narrowly,
treating the offensive portion of the standard as conjunctive. 123
The Supreme Court has yet to hear another student free speech
case since these changes to its composition, 124 but it is intriguing
to consider possible outcomes, given the combination of pure
speech and sexual connotations embodied in these trendy t-
shirts.125
CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal of the educational process is to prepare stu-
dents for citizenship in the United States. This is especially true
of those students in high school, given the fact that they not only
are more mature than elementary and middle school students,
but also closer to entering the real world. It is against this back-
drop that student free speech cases are being decided. School offi-
cials and courts should think twice before regulating student
speech, as it is this speech that is essential to exposing students
to a wide variety of viewpoints and ideas that will effectively
prepare them for the adult world. Tinker's substantial disruption
standard should be the analysis applied to most student speech
122 Id. at 209. "[W]e see little basis for the District Court's sweeping assertion that 'har-
assment'-at least when it consists of speech targeted solely on the basis of its expressive
content 'has never been considered to be protected activity under the First Amend-
ment."'
123 Id. at 213 (stating that Fraser prohibits speech which is "lewd," "vulgar," "indecent,"
and "plainly offensive"); see Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (positing that the First
Amendment does not prevent school officials from permitting a vulgar and lewd speech
that would undermine the school's basic educational mission).
124 The Supreme Court may get a chance to decide another student free speech case and
clear up the confusion over its past holdings. See 'Bong Hits' Banner Give Supreme Court
Chance to Clear the Air on Student Free Speech, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006. This article
discusses how Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (2006), is being "conferenced" by
the Court as a possible case for decision. Id.; see Frederick v. Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618
(2007) (describing the "Bong" controversy).
125 Eugene Volokh, a Professor of Law at UCLA, wrote an article synthesizing the view-
points of the Justices regarding free speech cases generally. Eugene Volokh, How the Jus-
tices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994--2000, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1191 (2001). He stated in
Buckley v. American Constitutional law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 192 (1999) that Jus-
tices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg took a fairly speech-protective view,
while Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor (no longer on the court) and Breyer took the "least-
speech protective view". Id. at 1202 n. 5. He also noted that in another case, Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), that Justices Stevens, Kennedy and Ginsburg
again took a "fairly speech-protective view" and likewise Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor
and Breyer took the least "speech-protective view" joined by Justice Souter this time. Id.
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cases with narrow exceptions set out under Hazelwood and Fra-
ser. Because it is an exception, Fraser's standard should be lim-
ited to prohibitions based on the manner, not content and read
narrowly to cover vulgar, lewd, obscene and offensive speech
only. Thus, the trendy, flirtatious t-shirts popular among stu-
dents today should be allowed, save any extreme language or ex-
pletives contained therein or a substantial disruption caused by
their presence.

